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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Petitioner, ThermalKEM, Inc., the owner and operator of 
a hazardous waste treatment facility in Rock Hill, South 
Carolina, petitions for review of the Environmental Appeals 
Board's ("EAB") dismissal of ThermalKEM's appeal of respondent, 
United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA"), decision 
denying ThermalKEM's request to amend its pending permit 
application.  EAB held it lacked jurisdiction to hear EPA 
Region IV's denial of ThermalKEM's proposed amendment to Part A 
of its pending permit application. 
 EPA Region IV had denied the amendment after concluding 
that it was an attempt by ThermalKEM to alter interim operating 
status to an extent that required Region IV approval.  ThermalKEM 
argued the proposed amendment would only have permitted 
ThermalKEM's facility to continue to process waste materials at 
the same rate it had before EPA's addition of several compounds 
to the class of substances EPA regulations define as hazardous. 
4 
ThermalKEM had incinerated these compounds at its treatment 
facility before their classification as hazardous. 
 After EAB dismissed ThermalKEM's administrative appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction, ThermalKEM filed this petition for 
review.  In its petition, ThermalKEM asks us to review EAB's 
refusal to hear its challenge but not the merits of that 
challenge.  Congress has strictly circumscribed our jurisdiction 
to review denials of applications for permits to dispose of toxic 
substances.  Therefore, for the reasons given below, we conclude 
that we lack jurisdiction over the EAB decision dismissing, 
without consideration of the merits, ThermalKEM's appeal of EPA 
Region IV's denial of ThermalKEM's proposal to amend Part A of 
its pending permit application.0 
 
I. 
 ThermalKEM, Inc. filed this petition for review on 
June 1, 1993, pursuant to section 7006(b) of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA" or "Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6976(b) (West Supp. 1994), contesting EAB's refusal to hear, on 
the merits, ThermalKEM's challenge to EPA's denial of the 
proposed permit application amendment.  ThermalKEM filed its 
                     
0ThermalKEM contends the proposed amendment to Part A of its 
pending permit application would not result in a burn of any 
greater quantity of any particular chemical than originally 
allowed under its interim status.  We will assume that is true, 
but note that the amendment would increase the quantity of 
hazardous materials burned at ThermalKEM's treatment facility 
because EPA has recently added some of the chemicals ThermalKEM 
has been treating to the list of those that are hazardous.  See 
55 Fed. Reg. § 11798 (Mar. 29, 1990) (amending 40 C.F.R. §§ 261, 
264, 265, 268, 271, 309). 
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petition for EAB review on January 31, 1992.  EAB dismissed 
ThermalKEM's petition on March 10, 1993, holding it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal from the decision of an EPA 
regional director on ThermalKEM's interim status.  See In re 
ThermalKEM, Inc., RCRA Appeal No. 92-4, slip op. at 4 (Mar. 10, 
1993). 
 ThermalKEM is a Delaware corporation.  It owns and 
operates a hazardous waste facility in Rock Hill, South Carolina, 
where it disposes of hazardous waste in various ways, including 
incineration.  RCRA governs the treatment, storage and disposal 
of solid waste in the United States, both hazardous and non-
hazardous.  Section 3005(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925(a), 
requires an owner or operator of hazardous waste treatment, 
storage or disposal facilities ("TSDF") to obtain a permit 
governing the facilities' operation.  Realizing that EPA could 
not possibly issue all necessary permits to all the hazardous 
waste treatment facilities in the United States as soon as RCRA 
went into effect, Congress enacted § 3005(e) of the Act, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6925(e), as a transitional measure.  Section 3005(e) 
allows an owner or operator of a facility that was in existence 
on November 19, 1980, (the effective date of RCRA) to continue 
operations pending issuance of a final permit so long as two 
conditions are met.  First, the owner or operator of the TSDF 
must timely notify EPA that it is operating a hazardous waste 
facility.  40 C.F.R. § 270.70(a)(1) (1992); see also 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6930(a).  Second, the owner or operator must file "Part A" of a 
RCRA permit application.  See 40 C.F.R § 270.70(a)(2); see also 
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United States (EPA) v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 
F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (N.D. Ind. 1989).0  Where an owner or 
operator meets these two conditions, any TSDF in operation on the 
relevant date automatically receives "interim status" and "shall 
be treated as having been issued [a] permit until such time as 
final administrative disposition of [the permit] application is 
made . . . ."  42 U.S.C.A § 6925(e); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 270.70(a).  The governing regulations explicitly state that 
interim status is not itself a "permit."  40 C.F.R. §§ 124.2, 
270.2 (definition of permit).  Moreover, interim status 
facilities may not process hazardous wastes beyond the treatment 
capacity specified on Part A of the facility's permit 
application.  If a facility operating on interim status wants to 
process hazardous substances in a greater amount than it 
represented it would or could in Part A of its permit 
application, it must either receive EPA approval, see 40 C.F.R. 
§ 270.72(a)(2), or qualify for an increase with respect to 
certain wastes that become newly listed or identified after it 
submits a revised Part A permit application.  See 40 C.F.R. 
                     
0The RCRA permit application consists of two parts.  Part A 
primarily gives general information.  It includes, e.g, the name 
and location of the facility, a general overview of the nature of 
the operation and an estimate of the rate of the facility's 
output of hazardous substances.  40 C.F.R. § 270.13.  Part B of 
the application is more detailed and includes specific 
information relating to disposal facilities, environmental 
impact, and other details necessary for the review of the permit 
application.  Id. § 270.14.  EPA will not review the permit 
application or issue a permit until it has received all of the 
information required on Part B of the permit application.  Id. 
§ 124.3. 
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§ 20.72(a)(1).0  Interim status terminates after the appropriate 
state and federal regulatory authorities render a final decision 
                     
0Section 270.72(a) provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), the 
owner or operator of an interim status 
facility may make the following changes at 
the facility: 
 
(1) Treatment, storage, or disposal of 
new hazardous wastes not previously 
identified in Part A of the permit 
application (and, in the case of newly 
listed or identified wastes, addition of 
the units being used to treat, store, or 
dispose of the hazardous wastes on the 
effective date of the listing or 
identification) if the owner or operator 
submits a revised Part A permit 
application prior to such treatment, 
storage, or disposal; 
 
(2) Increases in the design capacity of 
processes used at the facility if the 
owner or operator submits a revised 
Part A permit application prior to such 
a change (along with a justification 
explaining the need for the change) and 
the Director approves the changes 
because: 
 
(i) There is a lack of available 
treatment, storage, or disposal 
capacity at other hazardous waste 
management facilities, or 
 
(ii) The change is necessary to 
comply with a Federal, State, or 
local requirement. 
 
40 C.F.R. § 270.72(a) (1992).  Whether ThermalKEM's facility 
should automatically, under section 270.72(a)(1), receive 
permission to continue operations on interim status as heretofore 
upon mere submission of a revised Part A or must justify its 
request under section 270.72(a)(2) seems to be the issue on the 
merits, an issue not before us on this petition for review. 
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on the permit application, when the TSDF fails to timely submit a 
complete Part B of the application, or when the TSDF fails to 
comply with the rules governing operation on interim status.  40 
C.F.R. § 270.73. 
 On November 17, 1980, ThermalKEM, through its 
predecessor, Industrial Chemical Company, Inc., filed the 
notification 42 U.S.C.A. § 6930(a) requires and Part A of its 
permit application, thereby complying with the interim procedures 
in RCRA and achieving interim status.  In 1984, Congress amended 
RCRA by enacting the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act of 
1984 ("HSWA"), Pub. L. No. 616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987).  HSWA established a time 
schedule within which interim status facilities were to submit 
Part B of the permit application.  42 U.S.C.A. § 6925; see also 
40 C.F.R. § 270.73.  The EPA and South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") asked ThermalKEM to 
submit Part B of its application in accord with this schedule. In 
January of 1984, ThermalKEM submitted Part B to both EPA 
Region IV and the DHEC.  In 1985, Congress authorized South 
Carolina to implement its own hazardous waste program and DHEC 
took the lead in processing ThermalKEM's application for a 
permit.  Between January 1984 and May 1987, ThermalKEM worked 
with EPA and DHEC to complete Part B of ThermalKEM's permit 
application.  From time to time during this period, ThermalKEM 
revised Part A of its permit application to reflect changes in 
hazardous waste mass feed, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.10(g), 
270.70, and 270.72. 
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 In 1987, the DHEC advised ThermalKEM that its permit 
application was complete and listed it for public inspection and 
comment.  In 1988, the EPA and DHEC approved the ThermalKEM 
application and issued an operating permit for the facility for 
one incinerator unit.  Subsequently, two citizens' groups 
formally protested issuance of the permit.  Their protests 
automatically put the TSDF back on interim status until the 
protests were resolved.  That has not yet occurred and ThermalKEM 
remains on interim status. 
 On September 25, 1990, EPA's "organic toxicity 
characteristics" rule ("OTC rule") became effective.0 ThermalKEM 
concluded that the OTC rule redefined as hazardous a number of 
previously non-hazardous substances it handled at its facility.  
Believing its Part A application was no longer correct under the 
OTC rule, ThermalKEM filed a revised Part A on September 21, 
1990, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 270.12.  The revision identified 
the newly classified substances and showed a feed rate increase 
from 2.85 to 5.35 tons per hour.  Sixteen months later, on 
January 8, 1992, EPA Region IV notified ThermalKEM that its 
revised Part A application was a request to increase interim 
status incineration which required justification and EPA approval 
in accord with 40 C.F.R. § 270.72(a)(2).  EPA also concluded that 
                     
0See 55 Fed. Reg. 11,798 (March 29, 1990); 40 C.F.R. Part 261, 
subpart C.  "The rule, inter alia, establishes a new hazardous 
waste characteristic based on the leachability of hazardous 
constituents under the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure 
and adds 25 new organic constituents to the list of toxic 
constituents regulated under RCRA."  In re ThermalKEM, Inc., RCRA 
Appeal No. 92-4, slip op. at 2 n.2 (March 10, 1993) (citing 55 
Fed. Reg. at 11,803; Appendix II to 40 C.F.R. Part 261). 
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ThermalKEM's request to increase its hazardous burning rate 
should be denied unless ThermalKEM produced evidence of "trial 
burns" establishing that the increases were safe.0  Accordingly, 
EPA denied the Part A amendment. 
 On January 31, 1992, ThermalKEM petitioned the 
Administrator of the EPA for review of the denial of the revised 
Part A.0  On March 10, 1993, EAB, acting on behalf of the 
Administrator under a regulatory delegation, see 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.19(a) (1992), concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
petition.0  On June 1, 1993, ThermalKEM filed this petition for 
judicial review. 
 At the threshold, we confront the question of our own 
jurisdiction.  Whether we have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6976 is subject to plenary review.  Vineland Chem. Co. 
                     
0Trial burns are tests of the facility.  The EPA requires trial 
burns in certain cases to insure public safety.  Trial burns 
measure the feed rate at which an incinerator can operate without 
producing proscribed emission rates.  A facility must conduct new 
trial burns in order to increase its feed rate.  40 C.F.R. 
§ 270.42, App. I, L. 1, 2. 
0Before EAB, ThermalKEM argued on the merits that it was entitled 
to amend its application under 40 C.F.R. § 270.72(a)(1) without 
EPA approval.  In the alternative to its position that EAB lacked 
jurisdiction, EPA contended on the merits that ThermalKEM's 
amendment was governed by 40 C.F.R. § 270.72(a)(2) which requires 
EPA approval. 
0EAB has jurisdiction to consider "any condition of the permit 
decision."  40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a).  In a decision raising 
principles and issues similar to those present in this petition 
for review, EAB held that ThermalKEM's proposed amendment and 
Region IV's denial thereof was not a "permit decision" but a 
request to change interim status.  ThermalKEM, slip op. at 3-4. 
It held, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
ThermalKEM's challenge and never reached the merits.  Id. at 4. 
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v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 810 F.2d 402, 405-06 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
 
II. 
 It is axiomatic that our jurisdiction "is limited to 
that conferred by statute."  Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 405. 
Case law, however, "caution[s] this court not to construe 
appellate review of provisions too narrowly.  To avoid unintended 
and anomalous results, statutes authorizing review of specified 
agency actions should be construed to allow review of agency 
actions which are 'functionally similar' or 'tantamount to' those 
specified actions."  Id. 
 RCRA provides: 
 Review of the Administrator's action (1) 
in issuing, denying, modifying, or revoking 
any permit under section 6925 of this title 
. . . may be had by any interested person in 
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United 
States for the the [sic] Federal Judicial 
District in which such person resides or 
transacts such business upon application by 
such person.  Any such application shall be 
made within ninety days from the date of such 
issuance, denial, modification, revocation, 
grant, or withdrawal . . . . 
 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 6976(b) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 In Vineland we addressed an analogous issue on our 
jurisdiction under section 6976(b).  Vineland Chemical Co., like 
ThermalKEM, operated a TSDF under interim status after filing 
Part A of its permit application.  Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 
at 404.  In 1984, Congress amended the Act to give the EPA power 
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to terminate interim status if an interim facility did not comply 
with "financial responsibility requirements."  See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6925(e)(2).  When Vineland submitted information to complete 
Part B of its permit application, it did not provide assurance 
that closure and post-closure costs would be covered.  Relying on 
section 6925(e)(2), EPA terminated Vineland's interim status and 
Vineland petitioned for our review.  Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 
at 404-05. 
 EPA contested our jurisdiction arguing that termination 
of interim status was not an act "issuing, denying, modifying, or 
revoking any permit" that could be subject to court of appeals 
review under section 6976 because a facility operating under 
interim status was not operating under permit.  Vineland argued 
that "interim status is itself a permit."  Id. at 406.  We 
rejected that argument.  "The structure of § 6925 indicates that 
Congress was quite careful in distinguishing between permits and 
interim status. . . .  We conclude that the statute does not 
reflect any Congressional intent to include interim status within 
the meaning of 'permit.'"  Id. 
 Nevertheless, we went on to consider whether Congress 
intended to provide judicial review in the court of appeals of 
EPA's termination of a facility's interim status.  We observed 
that interim status could be terminated only by (1) acceptance of 
the permit application; (2) denial of the permit application; or 
(3) failure of the applicant to meet certain continuing 
obligations essential to interim status.  Id. at 407.  We noted 
that the first and second reasons for termination of interim 
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status are expressly reviewable under section 6976(b) but that 
the statute does not explicitly provide for judicial review of 
EPA's termination of interim status when a facility fails to meet 
its continuing obligations.  We concluded, however, that complete 
termination of interim status for failure to comply with 
continuing interim requirements "is the functional equivalent of 
a denial of a permit application on the merits."  Id.  We 
reasoned, "[b]oth result in the termination of the Agency's 
proceedings and require the facility to cease operations."  Id. 
We then stated, "we can think of no reason why Congress might 
have wished to relegate that category to the district court while 
providing appellate review for the other two categories."  Id. 
Thus, where termination of interim status for failure to meet 
certain qualifications was equivalent to a permit denial, we held 
that the agency's action was subject to appellate review in the 
courts of appeals.  Id. at 407-08.  We considered and rejected 
EPA's argument that no agency action had occurred because the 
termination was self implementing.  Id. at 408.  "[W]here the 
operator has attempted to comply but has, in the Agency's eyes, 
failed, we are not prepared to say the EPA has no obligation to 
take a position . . . ."  Id.  Accordingly, we held that "interim 
status terminations constitute agency actions reviewable in this 
court [when] an attempt at compliance has been made and the 
Agency has taken a definitive position that interim status has 
terminated."  Id.  Vineland has not been universally accepted.0 
                     
0See Sanders Lead Co. v. Thomas, 813 F.2d 1190, 1191 (11th Cir. 
1987) (per curiam); Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 
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 Vineland controls two issues in this case.  First, it 
clearly holds that interim status is not equivalent to permit 
status.  Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 406.  Second, it allows 
court of appeals review of agency decisions that do not involve 
permits when a party demonstrates that altering interim status is 
the "functional equivalent" of the denial of a permit.  Id. at 
408. 
 Vineland therefore requires us to consider the nature 
of the order ThermalKEM challenges before deciding whether we 
have jurisdiction over the petition.  Indeed, ThermalKEM does not 
ask us to review the decision of Region IV rejecting its proposed 
amendment to Part A of its permit application.  Strictly 
speaking, it asks us only to review the decision of the EAB that 
it lacked jurisdiction to hear ThermalKEM's administrative appeal 
of Region IV's denial of its proposed revision of Part A of its 
permit application.  Of course, we are nevertheless unable to do 
so without satisfying ourselves of our own jurisdiction. 
 Because EAB's decision is not, on its face, a decision 
on the merits of a permit or ThermalKEM's continuing interim 
status but a decision about EAB's own powers to review orders, it 
may be argued formalistically that the EAB decision is beyond the 
scope of the review that section 6976(b) contemplates.  Vineland, 
however, holds that we should review EPA actions that have the 
functional effect of termination under section 6976(b).  Vineland 
                                                                  
804 F.2d 371, 384 (7th Cir. 1986); Granger Land Dev. Co. v. 
Thomas, 786 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1986) (table); Hempstead County & 
Nevada County Project v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 
700 F.2d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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elevates the substance of the agency action over the form it 
takes.  Unquestionably, EAB has effectively affirmed Region IV's 
denial of ThermalKEM's proposed amendment when it declined 
jurisdiction over its administrative appeal.  EAB's refusal to 
entertain ThermalKEM's appeal made Region IV's action concerning 
interim status administratively final, and thus we think we must 
consider whether the EAB order is the "functional equivalent" of 
a permit denial.0  We hold it is not. 
 We can quickly deal with ThermalKEM's first argument 
that rejection of the proposed amendment to Part A of its permit 
application is a permit denial.  In Vineland, we specifically 
held that termination of interim status is not a denial of a 
permit.  Based on this, we must reject ThermalKEM's contention 
that the EPA's denial of its request to amend Part A of its 
permit application is a permit denial subject to our review. 
 ThermalKEM also contends that EPA partially terminated 
ThermalKEM's interim status for the incineration of certain 
materials when it rejected ThermalKEM's amended Part A 
application and that such a partial termination is reviewable 
under section 6976(b) in accord with Vineland.  We need not reach 
or decide whether a denial of an increase in feed rate after a 
change in EPA regulations constitutes a "partial termination." 
Even if we were to agree with ThermalKEM and conclude that EPA's 
actions did effect partial termination of ThermalKEM's interim 
                     
0Cf. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 3 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 
1993) ("The EAB's decision rejecting Ciba's petition for review 
of the original issuance of the permit constitutes action of the 
Administrator."). 
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status, EPA's action would not be reviewable under section 
6976(b). 
 Vineland is materially different from this case.  In 
Vineland, EPA revoked Vineland's interim status, not only 
terminating all agency consideration of Vineland's permit 
application but also causing its facility to cease operation. 
Here, EPA Region IV's act has at best altered ThermalKEM's 
interim status by reducing its facility's interim capacity to 
process hazardous wastes because EPA has added certain substances 
ThermalKEM had been processing to the category of hazardous 
wastes.  In Vineland, we made it clear that we were considering a 
termination of Vineland's interim status and the attendant 
effects of terminating all the affected facility's operations. We 
stated: 
 Because there is no indication of a 
Congressional intent to require district 
court review of terminations of interim 
status for failure to provide information, 
and because such terminations involve the 
same kind of judicial review as and are the 
functional equivalent of an interim status 
termination by the denial of a permit, we 
. . . conclude that all interim status 
terminations under the original § 6925(e) 
were rendered reviewable in the Courts of 
Appeals by the enactment of § 6976(b) in 
1980. 
 
 
Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 407-08 (emphasis added).  We also 
emphasized, "[w]e limit our holding that interim status 
terminations constitute agency actions reviewable in this court 
to situations in which an attempt at compliance has been made and 
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the Agency has taken a definitive position that interim status 
has terminated."  Id. at 408.  We likened loss of interim status 
to permit decisions because "[b]oth result in the termination of 
the Agency's proceedings and require the facility to cease 
operations."  Id. at 407; see also id. at 408 ("Since our search 
of the legislative history of the 1984 amendments has revealed no 
indicia of Congressional intent to distinguish between different 
kinds of interim status terminations, we . . . hold that agency 
decisions under § 6925(e)(2) are reviewable in the Courts of 
Appeal under § 6976(b).").  Because EPA's revocation of interim 
status forced a cessation of disposal activity, we concluded that 
EPA's actions were the functional equivalent of a permit denial. 
In the instant case, no termination has occurred and ThermalKEM 
concedes it "remains an interim status facility."  Brief of 
Petitioner at 7. 
 To be reviewable in a court of appeals under Vineland's 
rationale, a change in interim status must cause the termination 
of hazardous waste disposal and the cessation of attempts to 
receive EPA approval to engage in regulated activity if it is to 
be functionally equal to a permit denial.  ThermalKEM asks us to 
further expand Vineland's broad reading of section 6976(b) to 
hold that any EPA decision which alters interim status is 
reviewable in a court of appeals.  We do not think that Vineland 
should be extended in that way or that Congress intended to grant 
persons operating hazardous waste facilities on interim status a 
broad right to review in this or any other court of appeals. 
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 Because termination of interim status and denial of a 
permit both have the effect of halting operations and ending 
agency consideration of the facility's permit application, we 
concluded in Vineland that both should be subject to review in 
the same forum.  We thought a system that required separate 
forums to review occurrences that are functionally similar and 
lead to identical outcomes would be strange.  Though termination 
of interim status may be the functional equivalent of a permit 
denial, modification of interim status is not.  Not every 
adjustment to interim status has that aspect of finality, and it 
is plainly lacking here.  A partial termination does not stop a 
facility from operating, nor does it conclude EPA consideration 
of the matter.0 
 ThermalKEM is not left without further avenues of 
relief before the EPA and the judiciary.  Once a final decision 
is reached on its still pending permit, ThermalKEM can either 
challenge the permit's restrictions in this Court under section 
6976(b) or again apply to amend the permit.  Courts of appeals 
are not a forum for challenges to every interlocutory EPA action. 
See, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 821 F.2d 714, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining 
jurisdiction over challenge to regulation where potential for 
further agency action on issue remained).  Unless a party has no 
                     
0Though situations may occur in which alteration of interim 
status might have an effect, economic or otherwise, that prevents 
a facility from operation, that is not the case here.  ThermalKEM 
has not alleged or shown that its Rock Hill plant can no longer 
operate in light of the EPA's refusal to permit amendment of 
Part A. 
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further recourse before the agency, courts of appeals lack power 
to review the agency's interim decisions.  Instead, our 
jurisdiction to review EPA permit proceedings is limited to cases 
in which the agency's act has effectively terminated the 
operation of a facility on interim status and no further agency 
action will take place.  Vineland holds that facilities that have 
had their interim status terminated in that way have suffered 
final agency action that is functionally equivalent to a permit 
denial.  Only in these circumstances does Vineland hold that we 
have jurisdiction to review an EPA action that causes or directs 
a hazardous waste facility to cease operations.  If a facility 
remains in operation despite an administrative ruling which 
modifies its interim status, further administrative review is 
available after EPA takes final action on the facility's permit 
application before EAB.  Thereafter, this Court can review the 
agency's underlying interlocutory decisions concerning the 
permit.  Review of every EPA decision that alters interim status 
and the ensuing availability of piecemeal review would contravene 
the fundamental policy of judicial efficiency that underlies the 
finality that is a condition of judicial review. 
 If ThermalKEM remains dissatisfied with the EPA's 
action, it may still ask a district court to review EPA's 
interpretation of the statute's provision for interim status. See 
Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 407 (identifying district court 
as alternate forum if court of appeals lacks jurisdiction); cf. 
Hempstead County, 700 F.2d at 462-63 (transferring challenge to 
interim status to district court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 after 
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concluding section 6976(b) jurisdiction did not lie).  In 
Vineland, "we [could] think of no reason why Congress might have 
wished to relegate [interim status terminations] to the district 
court while providing appellate review for [direct permit 
denials]," and concluded that resort to the district court was 
inconsistent with the review structure implemented in RCRA. 
Vineland Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 407.  A facility that can 
continue to operate under a modified interim status does not face 
a harsh result that is equivalent to termination of a permit. 
Neither the text of section 6976(b) nor its legislative history 
persuades us that Congress intended the courts of appeals to 
review every change in interim status.  We believe such decisions 
should not be reviewed in an appellate court until they are 
incorporated into a final permit decision or the functional 
equivalent thereof.  If interim judiciary review is necessary, we 
think it should occur in a district court, a forum more suited to 
that purpose.0 
 In sum, we hold that Vineland did not extend our 
jurisdiction to review EPA's action affecting interim status 
beyond agency determinations that are the functional equivalent 
of permit denials because such action causes or requires the 
interim operator to cease operation.  While interim status 
                     
0Cf. Hempstead County, 700 F.2d at 462 (holding court of appeals 
not proper forum where, inter alia, proper record does not exist 
for appellate review and district court better suited to fact 
gathering task); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1980) ("While the 
court of appeals can devise procedures for the preparation of a 
record . . ., the district has both procedures and facilities at 
hand for that task."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). 
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terminations and permit denials both share the salient effect of 
cessation of operation and an end to EPA consideration, a 
modification of interim status will usually have neither effect. 
Whatever modification of interim status EPA's denial of 
ThermalKEM's proposed amendment may have, it is not "functionally 
equivalent" to a permit denial, and we therefore have no 
jurisdiction to review under section 6976(b) or otherwise to 
decide ThermalKEM's petition for review.  Accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction to review EAB's order dismissing ThermalKEM's appeal 
from Region IV's decision and will dismiss ThermalKEM's petition. 
 
                                   
